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Searching for faint traces of managerial opportunism in
french diversifying acquisitions
Abstract : We are looking for traces of managerial opportunism in french diversifying
acquisitions. Indeed, following various theories, diversification is seeking by managers.
Furthermore, recent empiric evidences show that corporate diversification is value
destructive for shareholders. Using classical OLS methodology with diversification,
management ownership and performance variables, we find some evidence of managerial
opportunism. But classical methodology presents two shortages. First, it supposed a unique
sense of causality. In particular, firm diversification is supposed to impact firm
performance without considering the inverse relationship (from performance to
diversification). This one-way analysis can create biases in the estimated results. Second,
this OLS methodology doesn’t permit to take simultaneously the relationship between our
variables. Noticing that this classical methodology is not well adapted to the problem, we
submit our data to a system of simultaneous equations. Using this system, according to us
better adapted, the faint traces of managerial opportunism vanishes. This is the case in
particular because the negative impact of diversification on performance disappears when
we consider a non recursive relation between the variables. We derive others surprising
results from our simultaneaous equations framework. Management stake in the equity can
influence or be influenced by the performance depending on wether the performance is
measured at the firm or at the operation (acquisition) level. Together, these results suggest
that we have to be cautious when searching for managerial opportunism in sample and
statistical studies. If manager opportunist inclination can be suspected in this kind of
studies, it has to be distinguished from manager opportunist behavior which is far more
difficult to exhibit.
Résumé :  Selon différentes théories, la diversification des activités de l’entreprise est
désirable par le dirigeant. Par ailleurs, les résultats empiriques récents font apparaître les
stratégies de diversification comme destructrice de valeur pour l’actionnaire. Nous
recherchons les signes d’un opportunisme managérial dans un échantillon d’acquisitions.
Ayant constaté les faiblesses et les biais éventuels qu’implique la méthodologie classique
des régressions selon les MCO, nous soumettons nos données à un système d’équations
simultanées, selon nous mieux spécifié. Les signes tangibles d’un opportunisme managérial
par diversification s’évanouissent alors, en particulier parce que la diversification
n’apparaît plus comme cause d’une faible performance.Searching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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Searching for faint traces of managerial opportunism in
french diversifying acquisitions.
1. Introduction
This article studies the performance of acquisitions by the French enterprises in tie with the
part of the capital owned by their managers and the strategic tendency that reveal these
operations. The objective of the study is to verify if the ownership of capital by managers
incites them to avoid value destructive decisions for shareholders and to search for value
creation. This idea became a standard hypothesis in the theoretical literature and has been
developed extensively and amended since.
Among decisions that may have an impact on the firm’s value, the diversification of its
activities is an important element. The corporate diversification is not necessarily value
destructive, but it weighs on this strategic orientation a suspicion of managerial discretion
that could go against the shareholders’ interest. The manager would try by corporate
diversification to increase his power, the size and the growth of the firm (Williamson 1963,
Baumol 1959), to reduce his risk of employment (Amihud and Lev 1981) or to entrenched
himself by overinvestments in activities where he can exercise his specific competences
(Shleifer and Vishny 1989). Prior studies seem to establish a negative relationship between
diversification and value since 1980 in United States (Berger and Ofek 1995, Campa and
Kedia 1999). In France the relationship between diversification and value is little
documented. Godard (1996, p. 372-374) observes a negative impact of the diversification
on the performance (Tobin’s Q in particular). This relation remains to confirm with other
measures of diversification.
To impute a diversification’s discount to managerial opportunism, we have to integrate in
the study a variable that takes in account the manager’s interest to undertake a
diversification. The part of capital owned by the manager plays this cast. By partialy
determining the importance of the manager’s control by shareholders, this part of capital
influences the interest he has to protect his «human capital». Therefore the part of capital
owned by managers influences his inclination to undertake a diversification forSearching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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entrenchment or risks reduction motives. Besides, representing the financial interest that he
possesses in the firm, a capital ownership by manager should incite him not to undertake
value destructive acquisitions.
The interest of this article is not only to replicate tests already led in other countries. The
present survey reexamines the treatment of data and the interpretation of prior results.
Indeed, most studies suppose that strategy influences performance without considering the
inverse causality. This a priori statement may have important consequences. First it incites
to believe that the manager, as responsible and decision-maker of the strategy, encourages
his interest against those of shareholders. Second, it can also drive to bias in the results of
the estimated models, and so in the interpretation of these results. We therefore submit our
data to a simultaneous equations system permitting to take in account the reciprocal
relations between our variables.
The integration of the ownership structure, the performance and the diversification within a
simultaneous equation framework tempt to give elements of answer to three questions : do
managers take better decisions because they possess more actions  ? Does the strategic
tendency followed at the time of the acquisition explain the performance for shareholders ?
Finally, can one discover through the study of these relations a manager’s opportunist
behavior at the time of acquisitions ?
The empiric framework is the one of acquisistions by the french firms quoted on the period
1991-1997. This framework proves to be indeed particularly adapted to the object of the
survey. Acquisitions require a manager's strong engagement (prospecting, bargaining)
where his possible opportunist behavior may be observable (Shleifer and Vishny 1988).
These operations also allow us to apply a «measure» of the consistent strategy
(diversification vs. specialization). Finally they permit to appreciate the performance of the
operation for the shareholders through the classic abnormal returns at the annoucement date
of the event. Since a majority of studies leans on the Tobin’s Q to measure the
performance, we also lead tests with a proxy of this variable, we then observe the
performance of the firm in general and not those of the particular event that constitutes the
acquisition.Searching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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We show that the diversification, if it is measured in tendency at the time of acquisition or
in level for the enterprise, doesn't influence, contrary to a rife idea, the performance of the
firm. The observation of a negative tie between performance and diversification would only
be owed to a bad specification of models used. According to our results, it would be rather
the weak performance of enterprises that would push them to multiply their sectors of
activities. This result is not consistent with the existence of managerial opportunism that
would find to express itself through a diversification strategy.
This article is organized as follows. The section 2 introduced data and the sample of
acquisitions. The section 3 is dedicated to the exploratory analyses. Standards (OLS)
regressions of the performance on the diversification and on the ownership structure are
examined there. The section 4 presents our simultaneous equation system and results of
evaluations. In short the last section pulls findings of the study.
 2. Data
 2.1 acquisitions
They are indifferently public offers (purchase, exchange, mixed) of listed firms or
acquisitions of non listed firms by French listed enterprises (64% on the «  règlement
mensuel  », 26% on the «  second marché  », the balance on «  comptant  »). The covered
period goes from 1991 to 1997. The size of the target must represent at least 5% of the
purchaser's turnover for the operation to be judged sufficiently large. The public offers have
been counted by consultation of information notes by the COB (Commission of stock
market operations) after being assured us of their success in the corresponding «année
boursière». Only the operations that corresponded to a real acquisition or that increased in a
meaningful way, i.e. beyond 50%, the purchaser's control on the target, have been recorded.
The maximal rate of control of the purchaser on the target before the acquisition has been
fixed to 70%. Ence, we avoid to take events that would only correspond to a group’s
internal restructuring.
Acquisitions of non listed targets have been recorded on the 1990-1996 period by
consultating the «Fusions and Acquisitions» magazine.
The date collected for the abnormal returns calculation (annoucement date) is the most
previous available date among : the date of announcement by the press, the date of the visaSearching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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of the SBF (French stock market Society) and in last recourse the date of the visa of the
COB. The announcement date by the press is determined while consulting archives of the
daily «echos» (Internet site) and those of «La tribune». Dates of the visa of receipt of the
COB are on the notes of information of purchasers, those of the SBF appear there too.
The stock returns have been collected on DATASTREAM database.
The methodology of abnormal returns calculation is based on the market model. The norm
is determining by simply regressing (ordinary least squares) the daily returns of stocks on
those of their reference market index (CAC40 or SBF 250 if the regression appears better
for the monthly settlement, the DATASTREAM second market index or « total index » for
the other stocks). The period of parameter evaluation is of 200 days of stock market. This
period ends 30 days before the event annoucement date. Some stock suffering of too few
datas have been eliminated. The abnormal returns are accumulated on 11 days framing the
date of announcement. The final sample is thus composed of 122 acquisitions, 29 having
accumulated abnormal returns (RAC) superior to 5%, 25 of the RACS lower to -5%, 68
between these two doorsteps.
2.2 the ownership structure
Data on the ownership structure are collected from the DAFSALIENS database. Numbers
took in account are those prevailing at the previous date the closest to the event
annoucement date. The collected data are:
-  The percentage capital owned by the manager and affiliated members (family, directors
(individual entity), people having a functional role within the business (DG),
shareholders listed as «friends» in DAFSALIENS). Let's note that the structure of big
French business groups sometimes makes the determination of this percentage delicate.
Indeed, one finds numerous firms juridically autonomous, quoted, that are controled to
a large majority by another firm : the parent companie (PC). Then, we have to row up
the chain of holding or affiliated companies to find, if it exists, the actual manager
(manager of the PC) and his indirect ownership in the firm (as far as the chain of
control is not broken). We thus get the percentage of interest owned by the real
manager in the purchaser.Searching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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-  The percentage owned by the directors (non executive) individual or legal entity.
-  The percentage owned by the external shareholders detaining more than 1% of interest.
2.3. Other data
-  The diversification: the number of SIC sectors (standard industrial classification) at the
2 and 3 numbers levels, the distribution of the turnover of every firm between its
different SIC sectors has been collected from DATASTREAM, the year before the
acquisition and the following year. These data being not available for all enterprises,
we completed them with the yearly reports of management. Entropy index has been
calculated from these data for the current exercise of the acquisition and the previous
exercise (calculation at the SIC2 and SIC3 levels). The changes in these indexes
between the two years, considering the relatively important size of the target, give us a
measure of the diversification owed to the acquisition of the target
1.
-  The Tobin’s Q: it is approximate according to an adaptation of the formula proposed
by Chung and Pruitt [1994]. Let's note D the total long term debt (due in more than 1
year), MV the stock capitalization of the enterprise, ANE the operating asset (net), S
the inventory (net), TA the total of tangible, intangible and financial fixed assets. The








Let's note that these accountants and financials numbers are all taken at the end of the
exercise previous the acquisition year and that they are collected from consolidated
statements.
- Other data : all datas on the turnover, the long term debt... have been collected from
DATASTREAM and are from consolidated statements at the end of the financial year
previous the acquisition date.
                                                          
1 See appendix for a brief presentation of the entropy index.Searching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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3. Agency problem, ownership structure and diversification : preliminary
analysis
3.1 the necessary conditions of an managerial opportunism by diversification
Let's define opportunism as the pursuit of his own interest to the detriment of another
stakeholder. The manager is, according to our acceptance, opportunist if, in a strategic
operation, he is susceptible to satisfy his own interest while actually harming the
shareholders’ interest. So that an opportunist behavior appears at the time of
diversification, it is therefore necessary that two conditions are gathered :
-  (1) the diversification have to be costly for shareholders
-  (2) it must present an interest for the manager.
We examine these conditions successively in order to construct a set of hypotheses which
will permit us to test the presence of managerial opportunism at the time of acquisitions by
the French enterprises.
Condition (1) «the diversification is costly for shareholders». This proposition is contested
by several theoretical arguments. The potential profits of the diversification find their
sources in (a) the research of a market power or a conglomeral power
2 , (b) the
maximization of quasi-rents’appropriation by the enterprise when it possesses a strategic
asset
3, (c) the effect of co-insurance between activities when the enterprise combines
activities that are no perfectly corelated
4, (d) a ressources allocation between activities more
efficient within the enterprise than within the «  external market  »
5, (e) the information
revelation (and a better control) on the manager’s behavior that can drag the
diversification
6.
                                                          
2 Anti-competitive effects of big diversified firms have been discuted since the beginiing of the seventies. For a
critical survey of this arguments, cf. Scott (1973).
3 For the arguments (a) and (b) cf. Montgomery (1994)
4 Following Lewellen (1971), this co-insurance effect should give to diversified firms a superior debt capacity
compare to mono-activity firms.
5 Following Williamson (1975), central corporate managers of diversified firm posses an audit ability that
shareholders do not have. Stein (1997) formalise this idea in the framework af an agency model.
6 Aron (1988) developed a model where corporate diversification is a way to reduce the agency costs and is
efficient even if diversification do not permit to acced to economies of scale.Searching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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But the arguments pleading for the diversification can often be reversed. The recent
empirical studies show that disadvantages of the diversification for shareholders prevail
over its advantages (Lang and Stulz 1994, Berger and Ofek 1995, Rajan, Servaes and
Zingales 1999, Lamont and Polk 2000). The advantages of «the internal market of capital»
can thus change in costs. It comes from a behavior of rent extraction by managers of
divisions that would spoil the working of this internal market
7. The discretionary
allocations of funds by the general management would push managers of divisions not to
undertake their better project but the one that minimizes the subsidization to weakers
divisions
8. Finally, the diversification can result from an agency problem between the
general management and the shareholders. Diversification is then considered beeing costly
for shareholders because it is undertaken in the managers own interest.
Condition (2) : « The corporate diversification is in the interest of manager ». The manager
possesses indeed, following several theories, an inclination to diversify firm. Managerial
theories put forward the manager’s inclination to search for an increase of the size of the
firm (Baumol 1959). The diversification, especially if it is realized by external growth, is a
means to increase the firm size. Managers would derive several advantages of it: (a)
resources under management’s control contribute to increase the feeling of power that the
managers benefit (Jensen, 1986); (b) the growth of the firm also allows the manager to
affirm his power on his subordinate, and to ascertain their loyalty. While assuring a steady
growth, the diversification offers the subordinate opportunities of promotion (Donaldson,
1984). This way, it allows the manager to possibly conclude some implicit (entrenchment)
contracts with them (Paquerot, 1996). (c) numerous studies show that size and
remuneration are positively correlated. Rose and Sheppard (1997) show that the
diversification, if it doesn't have ceteris paribus positive impact on the remuneration, is
nevertheless positively linked to the remuneration via its impact on the firm size. This
                                                          
7 For example, see Scharfstein and Stein (1999).
8 Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (1999) build a model based on this idea. They show that a larger diversity is
associate with a bigger discount of the company. Lamont and Polk (2000) confirm this result with a comparable
measure of diversity.Searching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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research of growth by the manager conceals costs for shareholders. It can make the
enterprise growing beyond an optimal size (surinvestment), drive to a reduction of of the
manager’s management capabilitie or to drive him to undertake a non linked diversification
that may create internal conflicts concerning the cash-flows allocation.
The agency theory especially insists on the manager's risk aversion as incitement to the
diversification and as source of costs for shareholders. Agency costs of the diversification
are then owed to the manager desire to reduce his risk of employement (Amihud and Lev
1981), i.e. to limit his risk of reputation, of fall of income or dismissal while reducing the
variability of results of the enterprise.
In the framework of the « entrenchment theory », Shleifer and Vishny (1989) propose a
point of view a little more restraining concerning to the interest of managers to undertake a
diversification. Managers would not be systematically tempted to diversify their enterprise.
Unlike, they would diversify or «surinvest» in a selective manner, in business units (or
activities) where their management competencies would guarantee them a good
performance vis-à-vis the possible pretenders in their job. But these selective investments
in their «domain of excellence» (marketing, engineering...) would not benefit (or not a long
time) to shareholders. On the contrary, they would have for objective to maximize the
difference between the value of the business managed by the incumbent team and the value
it would have, managed by her «second best team» available on the market for managers. It
then making it expensive to dismiss the team in place. Once committed, this phenomenon is
pernicious since it forbids, except to undergo an important cost, the shareholders to dismiss
the manager and permits to these last to continue surinvesting in their domains of
competence.
Globally, it is possible to affirm that (1) the diversification should prove to be value
destructive for shareholders on the recent period and that (2) the manager possesses a
propensity to diversify the firm that could push him to adopt an opportunist behavior at the
time of acquisitions. We propose to search for signs of an opportunist behavior while
integrating in the analysis the part of the capital owned by the manager.Searching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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3.2 performance, diversification and ownership structure : the necessary ties to
conclude to a managerial opportunism
Several hypotheses are foreseeable concerning the influence of capital owned by the
manager on the performance of the firm and its acquisitions. The hypothesis of « interests
convergence » expresses that the more the manager owns capital, the more he supports the
patrimonial consequences of his decisions and the more he is incited to manage in the
interest of shareholders. As far as the diversification has a negative impact on the
performance of the firm and its acquisitions, diversification should decrease with the
percentage of capital owned by the manager. Nevertheless this relation is not necessarily
linear since for strong stake in the capital the manager is incited to diversify his financial
patrimony and to reduce the total risk rather than the only systematic risks of the firm.
Otherwise the hypothesis of « interest convergence » is contested.
For Morck and al. (1988), the relation between part of the capital owned by the manager
and performance is not necessarily linear. Beyond a certain level, the manager could take
advantage of the capital he owns to favorise his pecuniary or non pecuniary advantage to
the detriment of the others shareholders. One can transcribe this analysis at the level of the
manager's propension to undertake a costly diversification : only beyond a certain level of
capital owned, the manager would make his own interests prevail and would diversify the
firm. Nevertheless, it is likely that as his stake increases, the convergence of interest
imposes itself and incite the manager not to undertake a value destructive diversification.
Finally, if the manager's opportunist behavior prevails, we should observe a negative, non
necessarily strictly linear, relationship between the manager’s stake in the capital and the
level of diversification. The tendency to the diversification (changes in the level of
diversification as a consequence of the acquisition) should then possibly increase in a first
time with manager stake and decrease or being stable (protection of his financial capital)
for strong percentage of capital owned.
In summary we will question managerial opportunism if : (1) diversification has a negative
impact on the performance (hypothesis 1, H1) ; (2) the diversification is negatively linked
to managerial stake in the equity (H2); (3) and, the tie between performance and structure
of ownership is compatible with the previous relations, that means positive (H3).Searching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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3.3 test of relations predicted with classical methods
By « classical » we mean some linear regression methods (OLS) that are often used in this
kind of study.
Hypothesis (1) : «the diversification has a negative impact on the performance». We verify
in the table 1 that acquisitions that contribute to increase the diversity of the firm are
discerned badly by the market (regression 1). In the second regression, using the
decomposition property of the entropy index, we observe that it is the inter-sectorial or
«non linked» diversification that is responsible for weak performance of diversifying
acquisitions. The regression 3 radicalizes the definition of diversification acquisitions and
reinforce the previous results. An acquisition is said to be a « diversificative » one there if
the firm add a new sector (level SIC2) to the old ones. The entry in a new sector misleads a
decrease of the RAC, but this reduction is attenuated by the number of SIC2 sectors that
possessed the enterprise before its acquisition (variable « Dummy(div)*SIC2 »): enterprises
possessing 3 sectors before the acquisition don't suffer, on average, of negative RAC.Searching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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TABLE 1 :
Acquisitions performance and diversification
Regression of the abnormal cumulative returns (RAC) on various indexes of changes in firm diversification levels.
The OLS regressions take account for a possible heteroscedasticity of residuals (Newey-West correction). The
dependant variable is the cumulative abnormal return on [j-5,j+5], where j is the annoucement day, the number of
observations is 107 in each regression. The values in brackets give the probability that the coefficient is equal to 0
(p value). The coefficient significatively different from 0 at 95% are in bold.
Independant variables are : DENTROP : changes in the entropy index between the year of the acquisition and the
prior year, suffixes “LIE” and “nonLIE” means respectively the intrasectorial (link) and intersectorial (non link)
components of the entropy measure of diversification. EXP(DENTROP) : exponential of the “DENTROP”
entropy measure. Dummy (div) : dichotomic variable which take the value 1 if the target has a SIC code different
from those of the acquirer, 0 if the acquisition doesn’t add a SIC code to the acquirer. SIC2 : The number of SIC2
codes of the acquirer the year before the acquisition. LOG (CA) : logarithm of the acquirer’s turnover the year
before the acquisition. Dettes/MV : ratio (total of long term debt/ market capitalization) measured at the end of the
financial year prior to the acquisition.
Independant variables
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 0,117  (0,044) 0,168  (0,029) 0,128  (0,026)
EXP (DENTROP) -0,041  (0,051) -0,040  (0,075)
EXP (DENTROPLIE) -0,005  (0,853)
EXP (DENTROPnonLIE) -0,083  (0,039)
Dummy(div) -0,047  (0,103)
Dummy(div)*SIC2 0,014  (0,064)
LOG(CA) -0,005  (0,135) -0,006  (0,118) -0,006  (0,078)
Dettes/MV 0,001  (0,000) 0,001  (0,000) 0,001  (0,000)
R
2 adjusted 0,041 0,029 0,041
F 2.52 1.79 1.93
We verify the same way in the table 2 that the diversification (in level) has a negative
impact on the performance of firms implied in acquisitions in our sample.
The regression 1 (table2) shows that the level of diversification doesn't seem to influence
the estimated value of Tobin’s Q of firms. Nevertheless, the second regression shows that
the linked component of diversification has a negative impact on the Tobin’s Q. This
negative impact is still present in regressions 3 and 4 (table 2). In short the level of debt
exercises a negative impact while the growth rate of the sector doesn't seem to influence the
performance.Searching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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TABLE 2 :
Diversification level and firms performance
Regression of the firms performance (estimated Tobin’s Q) on various indexes of firms level of diversification.
The OLS regressions take account of a possible heteroscedasticity of residuals (Newey-West correction). The
dependant variable is the estimated Tobin’s Q, the number of observations is 107 in each regression. The values in
brackets give the probability that the coefficient is equal to 0 (p value). The coefficient significatively different
from 0 at 95% are in bold.
Independant variables are : Entrop (n-1) : level of the entropy measure of diversification, measured for the
financial year before the acquisition. Suffixes “LIE” and “nonLIE” means respectively the intrasectorial (link) and
intersectorial (non link) components of the entropy measure of diversification
 SIC2, SIC3 : Numbers of SIC2 and SIC3 codes of the acquirer before the acqisition. LOG (CA) : logarithm of
the acquirer’s turnover the year before the acquisition. Dettes/MV : ratio (total of long term debt/ market
capitalization) measured at the end of the financial year prior to the acquisition.. SectMV : average percentage of
growth of the market capitalisation of french firms which posses the same principal SIC sector as the firm studied.
This average growth is calculated for the 2 years preceding and the year including the acquisition.
Independant variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 4.799  (0.000) 4.710  (0.000) 5.167  (0.000) 5.070  (0.000)
Entrop (n-1) -0.294  (0.147)
Entroplie (n-1) -0.614  (0.076)
Entropnonlie (n-1) -0.182  (0.439)
SIC2 0.0178  (0.270)
SIC3 -0.020  (0.108)
Log(CA) -0.169  (0.035) -0.161  (0.045) -0.208  (0.009) -0.195  (0.015)
Dette/MV -1.430  (0.000) -1.433  (0.000) -1.501  (0.001) -1.483  (0.001)
SectMV 0.972  (0.198) 0.927  (0.226) 1.042  (0.351) 1.019  (0.384)
R
2 adjusted 0.227 0.222 0.217 0.222
F 8.65  (0.000) 6.94  (0.000) 8.21  (0.000) 8.41  (0.000)
Hypothesis 2  : «The diversification is negatively linked to managerial ownership». As
previously, we achieved different regressions according to the OLS method between
diversification and the manager ownership at the acquisition level and then at the firm
level.
At the acquisitions level, the table 3 make clearly appear that the manager propensity to
diversify the firm decreases with the percentage of capital he owns. The more the manager
owns capital, the less the change toward an increased diversification of the firm is large.
These results are consistent with our hypothesis.Searching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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TABLE 3 :
Regressions of changes in diversification following acquisition on ownership
structure variables
Regressions of changes in the indexes measures of diversification on ownership structure variables. The OLS
regressions take account of a possible heteroscedasticity of residuals (Newey-West correction). The number of
observations is 107 in each regression. The values in brackets give the probability that the coefficient is equal to 0
(p value). The coefficient significatively different from 0 at 95% are in bold.
 Independants variables are: Diravt  : manager’s percentage of interest in the equity of the firm, measured at the
prior date the closest of the acquisition annoucement date. Log(Diravt) is its logarithm. Extcumavt: cumulative
percentage of capital owned by known shareholders non members of the board. Sic3: number of SIC3 codes of the
firm prior the acquisition. . LOG (CA) : logarithm of the acquirer’s turnover the year before the acquisition.













Constant -0.056  (0.728) 0.094  (0.553) -0.030  (0.759) 0.124  (0.192)
Diravt 0.196  (0.091)
Log (Diravt) 0.035  (0.029) 0.019  (0.051) 0.016  (0.050)
Extcumavt 0.561  (0.006) 0.561  (0.054) 0.396  (0.123) 0.164  (0.128)
Sic3 0.033  (0.123) 0.063  (0.047) 0.031  (0.071) 0.032  (0.060)
Log (CA) -0.005  (0.578) -0.012  (0.317) 0.001  (0.897) -0.012  (0.104)
Dettes/MV -0.019  (0.487) -0.038  (0.297) -0.040  (0.066) 0.002  (0.899)
R
2 adjusted 0.073 0.123 0.092 0.083
F 2.669  (0.026) 2.964  (0.018) 2.423  (0.044) 2.260  (0.057)
We also notice that the concentration of the external shareholding (variable « extcumavt »)
is positively linked to the diversification that implies an acquisition. This result is
compatible with predictions of the Diamond and Verrechias’ model (1982) in which, when
managers face shareholders that can’t observe their acts precisely (financial type control),
they tend to privilege a reduction of the firm’s risk. At the level of firms involved in
acquisitions results prove to be as compliant to our waitings (cf. table 4).Searching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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TABLE 4 :
 Regression of firm’s diversification (in level) on ownership structure variables
Regressions of the entropy measures of diversification and its components on ownership structure variables. The
OLS regressions take account of a possible heteroscedasticity of residuals (Newey-West correction). The number
of observations is 107 in each regression. The values in brackets give the probability that the coefficient is equal to
0 (p value). The coefficient significatively different from 0 at 95% are in bold.
Independant variables are:  Typecontrôle: ratio (percentage of capital owned by directors bound to the
CEO(affiliated directors)/ percentage owned by director non bound to the CEO). Squared (Diravt): (diravt prior
variable)
2  Cube (Diravt) : (Diravt)















Constant -0.483  (0.155) -0.424  (0.222) -0.394  (0.265) -0.171  (0.620) -0.314  (0.089)
Diravt -0.751  (0.000) -1.831  (0.001) -3.714  (0.000) -1.170  (0.009) -0.227  (0.054)
Squared
(Diravt)
- 1.705  (0.030) 8.942  (0.010) 1.004  (0.050) -
Cube (Diravt) -6.456  (0.024)
Typecontrôle -0.008  (0.000) -0.008  (0.000) -0.008  (0.000) -0.005  (0.001) -0.003  (0.004)
Extcumavt 0.000  (0.984) 0.165  (0.819) 0.001 (0.826) - -
Log (CA) 0.082  (0.001) 0.081  (0.001) 0.081  (0.001) 0.042  (0.087) 0.043  (0.001)
Dette/MV 0.227  (0.107) 0.227  (0.120) 0.226  (0.116) 0.210  (0.175) 0.014  (0.820)
R
2 adjusted 0.274 0.295 0.307 0.218 0.099
F 9.01  (0.000) 8.38  (0.000) 7.711  (0.000) 5.678  (0.000) 3.952  (0.005)
The different specifications tested in the first three variables show that the relation between
level of diversification and managerial ownership can be considered as linear (regression
1), even though other specifications are valid on our data (regressions 2 and 3). Regressions
4 and 5 show that it is especially the non link (intersectorial) component of the
diversification that can be considered as non linearly link to managerial ownership while its
link component is associated in a linear way to the manager engagement in the capital.
In conclusion signs of a managerial opportunism are gathered. To be sure of this, we have
to verify that the relation between manager ownership and performance is consistent with
the prior results. Since the diversification seems value destructive and that, the more the
manager owned equity the less he diversifies the firm, we should observe a positive
relationship between performance and manager ownership of the firm. Tables 5 and 6Searching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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confirm that such a relation exists, even though this one receives a weak statistical
significance level when the performance is mesured at the time of acquisitions.
TABLEAU 5 :
Acquisitions performance and ownership structure
Regression of cumulative abnormal returns on ownership structure. The OLS regressions take account of a
possible heteroscedasticity of residuals (Newey-West correction). The number of observations is 107 in each
regression. The values in brackets give the probability that the coefficient is equal to 0 (p value). The coefficient
significatively different from 0 at 5% level are in bold.
Independant variables: cf. prior tables


























2 adjusted : 0.123 ; F : 1.907  (0.077)
At the acquisitions level, the positive relation shown is significant only at a 10% level.
Levels of statistical significance are a lot more important when we consider the relation
between manager ownership and performance of the firm measured with the Tobin’s Q
(table 6).Searching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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TABLE 6 :
Regressions of ownership structure variables on firms Tobin’Q
The OLS regressions take account of a possible heteroscedasticity of residuals (Newey-West correction). The
number of observations is 107 in each regression. The values in brackets give the probability that the coefficient is
equal to 0 (p value). The coefficient significatively different from 0 at 5% level are in bold.






Constant 4.281  (0.001) 4.336  (0.001)
Log(Diravt+1%) 1.933  (0.017)
Diravt 1.458  (0.025)
typecontrôle -0.016  (0.005) -0.016  (0.005)
Extcumavt -0.016  (0.410) -0.016  (0.421)
Log(CA) -0.152  (0.058) -0.154  (0.058)
Dette/MV -1.550  (0.000) -1.549  (0.000)
Sectmv 1.049  (0.154) 1.050  (0.154)
R
2 adjusted 0.278 0.276
F 7.62  (0.000) 7.54  (0.000)
The relationship between these variables is decreasing, possibly with a decreasing
coefficient (regression 1, the explanatory variable is Log (Diravt)).
The set of results are in agreement : signs of the leader's opportunist behavior seem
gathered. It is besides often following this methodology that previous studies concluded to
the opportunist propensity of managers diversifying strategy (cf. Amihud and Lev, 1981, or
more recently Dennis and al., 1997). We nevertheless think that the methodology is
questionable, in particular because it doesn't consider the reciprocal relations that can exist
between the main variables studied.
3.4 A necessary reconsideration of the data treatment
The methodology previously followed and the tests performed pose two problems
susceptible to provide biased estimated coefficients and to mislead us in mistake in the
results interpretation.
In the first place, the prior hypotheses and tests performed suppose that the sense of
causality goes from the diversification to the performance. However, several arguments
plead in favor of a inverse causality (or determination) sense : the performance level maySearching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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influence diversification. For Rumelt (1974, p. 82) firms with a main activity sector weakly
performant are incited to diversify. The ressources based view tell us that an effective firm
(in regard with its capacity to generate cashflows) posses the necessary conditions to
diversify (Chatterjee and Wernerfelt, 1991). Following the Shleifer and Vishny’s model
(1989), managers of weakly effective enterprises are incited to diversify in order to « re-
entrenched » themselve. This time again, it is the level of (relative) performance that is the
causal element of the diversification. The Amihud and Lev hypothsesis (1981) is also
compatible with a causality going from the performance to the diversification. If the
manager is incited to protect his risk of employment by diversification, it may be because
the enterprise endures a weak performance and that his employment risk is consequently
raised. Results of studies having tempted to explicitly determine the sense of causality of
the relation remain mitigated. They conclude eitheir to the «classic» sense
(diversification⇒ performance) (Lang and Stulz, 1994), either to a predominance of the
inverse causality (Grant, Jammine and Thomas, 1988), but remain prudent in their
conclusions.
If a reciprocal relation between diversification and performance prevails, the OLS
regressions previously performed drive to biased estimated coefficients. This is the direct
consequence of the break of one fundamental assumption of these regressions : the
independancy between residues and the explanatory variables of the regression.
If one of the explanatory variables is itself explained by the explained variable, this
hypothesis cannot be respected. We must therefore resort to a method that permits to
palliate this possible bias.
A modelling specifying no sense of causality a priori is much more important than it will
drive us, beyond the correction of the bias on the estimated coefficient, to reconsider the
interpretation of results concerning the presence of a managerial opportunism. Indeed, in
the hypothesis of a negative impact of the performance on the diversification, the
probability of occurrence of an opportunist behavior is reduced. Shareholders, the manager
and the firm that he manages are then in a situation which is a priori not confortable. Then,
the diversification has to be interpreted more as a conservatory reaction on behalf of the
manager and, even though he profites from this strategic movement, the situation let himSearching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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little discretionary margin to increase his satisfaction to the detriment of the shareholders’
interest. If diversification drive performance, we won't be able to conclude to the
demonstration of an managerial opportunism.
Secondly, the methodology exposed in the previous paragraph doesn't permit to take
simultaneously in account the diversification, the performance and the ownership structure.
However it seems to us that, if the manager adopts an opportunist behavior, he will
simultaneously take account of the performance anticipated, of the diversification and of
his stake in the capital. These elements must be integrated simultaneously. Otherwise,
Loderer and Martin (1997) and Cho (1998) observe that causality goes from performance to
the manager ownership, and not from ownership to performance. This result is amazing
concerning a relationship that have been studied for a so long time. It can be interesting to
also test this relation on the French market.
In summary, we must used a model that takes simultaneously in account diversification,
performance and manager’s ownership and that considers some reciprocal relations
between diversification and performance, and between managerial ownership and
performance.
4. Tests in a simultaneaous equations framework
We successively treat our data in the setting of acquisitions (where the performance is
measured by the RAC and the diversification is measured in changes), and in the setting of
firms involved in these acquisitions (the performance is then measured by the Q and the
diversification is in level).
4.1 the case of acquisitions
The specification of the model is founded on the previous section developments. The
acquisitions performance (RAC) should be function, of course of the tendency to the
diversification, possibly of the capital owned by the manager. These three variables are
endogeneous. We integrate in addition:
•  The relative change of the firm’s risk following the acquisition, the third section (table 5)
having shown a surprisingly (weakly significant) positive impact of this change on the
performance.Searching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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• The importance of capital owned by directors bound to the manager relatively to the
capital owned by non bound directors. This variable, while defining the power that
possesses the manager in the board, should be negatively bound to the performance.
•  The external shareholding capital concentration.
•  The logarithm of the market capitalization (size variable that should be negatively linked
to the RAC).
•  A dichotomic variable which take the value 1 if the operation is a public offer, 0
otherwise (when the target is non listed). This last variable represents the different
bargaining condition the manager faces when the operation is public and when it is not. In a
parallel way it partially takes in account the financing of the acquisition (a public offer
having a priori greater probability to be financed by stocks that an acquisition of a non
listed firm). However, it prevents us from introducing the financing of the operation
directly in the model. The financing of the operation is probably not independent of the
structure of the capital (risk of control dilution at the time of stock financing) nor of the
level of diversification or risk of the operation. If we integrate the financing of the
operation, we would therefore have to endogenise this variables, that is to say to define it
according to ties that it maintains with the others variables. We therefore exclude financing
variables in a quite arbitrary way. Our model is necessarily simplifying and can't integrate
all possible interrelationships between the firm’s financial stakeholders.
The tendency to the diversification is function from other endogenous variable. The other
explanatory variables of the changes in diversification level, considered as exogenous, are :
•  The level of diversification before the operation (measured by the number of SIC3 codes)
in the sense that this level is «fixed» at the time of the acquisition and could influence the
manager's choice.
•  The importance of capital owned by directors bound to the manager relatively to the
capital owned by non bound directors. A large value of this variable indicates a weak
control on the manager. He is little submitted to risks (employement risk) that incite him to
diversify the firm when his financial stake in the firm capital is weak. He therefore loses
advantages to the diversification on one hand, but on the other hand he possesses of meansSearching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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to undertake diversifying acquisitions for their other advantages (size, prestige, implicit
contracts…), thanks to this entrenchment lever. The effect of this variable is, a priori,
indeterminate.
•  The external shareholding capital concentration. This one rises the risk incured by the
manager by increasing the pressure of a financial type control. Our hypothesis stipulates
that these external shareholders could tolerate a diversification, a positive effect of this
variable should dominate.
•  the size measured by the logarithm of the market capitalization at the end of the exercise
prior the acquisition.
•  The change in the firm total risk in that it can influence the manager's choice concerning
the desirable level of diversification to reach in regard of the (anticipated) risk level the
manager targets.
Finally, the specification of the equation defining the level of managerial ownership
integrates the performance and in addition : •  The firm size measured by the logarithm of
its market capitalization, because the manager’s stake is constrained by his own wealth
(more the capitalization is big, more it is likely that he will owned a weak part of it).•  The
total risk of the enterprise (cf. Demsetz and Lehn, 1985): more the business will be risky,
less the leader will be minded to invest some important sums there, he will prefer to
diversify his financial portfolio. Several measures of the risk are proposed by Demsetz and
Lehn (1985): we display, in respect with the Amihud and Lev hypothesis (1981), a
preference for the total risk of the enterprise. • The concentration of the external
shareholding that could dissuade it, account held of the risk that it makes him to support, to
invest in his firm, or on the contrary to incite him to invest there in order to clear itself of
this constraint (entrenchment). • the level of diversification measured by the number of
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with:  ij α  exogenous variable coefficients;  ij β  endogenous variable coefficients,
exogenous and endogenous variables are explained in the table of results;  ij ε  a residual
term. Specified thus, the model is identifiable. Results of the evaluation achieved on our
107 observations appear in the table 7.Searching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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TABLE 7 :
Simultaneous equations analysis of acquisitions performance, diversification and
manager’s ownership
Simultaneaous equations system estimated by the Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) technic.
Endogeneous variables are: the acquisition performance (measured by RAC), the diversification implied by this
acquisition (measured by the change in the exponential of the entropy meausre of diversification).
Exogeneous variables are: Type acquisition : =1 if public offer (OPA, OPE, mixte), 0 otherwise (acquisition of
unlisted firm); SIC3 : number of SIC3 segments reported by the acquirer; Etype3/Etype1 : Ratio of firm’s total
risk after the acquisition on total risk before the acquisition. Total risk is measured by standard error of stock’s
returns. Type contrôle : ratio (percentage of capital owned by directors bound to the CEO(affiliated directors)/
percentage owned by director non bound to the CEO). Extcum : cumulated percentage of capital owned by the









Constant -0.033  (0.816) 0.879  (0.013) 1.435  (0.000)
RAC -0.356  (0.677) 0.416  (0.519)
EXP(Delta Entropie) -0.029  (0.778)
%DIR 0.133  (0.017) 0.272  (0.244)
Type acquisition -0.000  (0.992)
SIC3 0.048  (0.008) -0.028  (0.036)
Etype3/Etype1 -0.078  (0.060) -0.134  (0.388)
Type contrôle 0.001  (0.071) 0.001  (0.741)
%extcum 0.295  (0.044) 0.734  (0.155) -0.836  (0.0192)
Etype1 -8.745  (0.058)
Log(MV) 0.006  (0.284) 0.005  (0.804) -0.062  (0.000)
R
2 adjusted 0.028 0.108 0.296
P (stat de Wald) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Contrary to Loderer and Martin [1997] we note that the part detained by the manager
determines the performance of the operation (equation 1). This relation is more statiscally
significant than with the classic methodology. It confirms that the part detained by the
manager exercises an incitative effect at the time of an acquisition. On the other hand, the
performance of the acquisition, that we can consider as opportunities of profitable growth
(partially anticipated by the manager), doesn't determine the part he owns in the equity
(equation 3). Therefore, one of the hypotheses necessary to exhibit an opportunist behaviorSearching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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is corroborated. We have to verify if this opportunist behavior appears through the
diversification that achieves the acquisition.
However for the other relations between endogenous variables, results are differents from
those observed with a classical approach. In particular, when variables are simultaneously
taken in the model, the diversification doesn't exercise any more impact on the performance
of the acquisition (regression 1). The anticipated performance doesn't seem either to guide
the strategic tendency that initiates the operation (regression 3). No tie is shown between
diversification and performance. Consequently, traces of the manager's opportunist
behavior by diversification can’t be raised. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that
the part detained by the manager doesn't influence the diversification implied by the
acquisition (regression 2).
4.2 the case of firms implied in acquisitions
A system, similar in spirit to the one presented for acquisitions, has been builded. Results of
the evaluation are presented in the table 8. Regressions appear more significant for firms
taken in their whole except for the level of diversification that remains little explained.Searching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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TABLEAU 8 :
Simultaneous equations analysis of firm performance, diversification level and
percentage of capital owned by the manager
Simultaneaouss equations system estimated by the Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) technic.
Endogeneous variables are: the acquisition performance (measured by Tobin’s Q), the diversification in level
(measured by the entropy index), the percentage owned by the manager.
Les variables exogènes sont : Etype1 : firm total risk before the acquisition. Total risk is measured by
standard error of stock’s returns over 200 stock exchange days before acquisition. Type contrôle : ratio
(percentage of capital owned by directors bound to the CEO(affiliated directors)/ percentage owned by director
non bound to the CEO). Extcum : cumulated percentage of capital owned by the known external shareholders.
Log(MV) : Log of acquirer market capitalization at the end of the financial year before the acquisition.
Croissance secteur : average Growth rate of market capitalization of french firms having the same main sector as








constant 4.644  (0.005) 0.857  (0.161) 1.454  (0.000)
Q -0.174  (0.005) 0.048  (0.009)
Entropie -0.461  (0.236)
%DIR 0.810  (0.496) -1.080  (0.001)
Type contrôle -0.020  (0.099) -0.013  (0.001)
%Extcum -1.431  (0.616) -0.872  (0.338) -0.747  (0.251)
Log(MV) -0.189  (0.079) 0.027  (0.451) -0.074  (0.000)
Croissance secteur 0.901  (0.086)
Etype1 -8.80  (0.021)
R
2 adjusted 0.128 0.041 0.256
P(Stat de Wald) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Results present some considerable differences with those of the previous table. This time,
the performance is not influenced by the capital owned by the manager but it determines
this percentage. The firm past performance and its growth opportunities that are
«capitalized» in its market value influence management ownership positively (regression
3), but the reciprocal relation doesn’t appear (regression 1). It is compliant to the result of
Cho [1998] who observes an positive impact of the Q on the manager ownership without
the inverse relationship beeing significant. Loderer and Martin [1997] conclude also to a
determination of manager’s ownership by the performance of the firm (q of Tobin), but its
impact is negative in their results. This result, somewhat atypical in relation to results andSearching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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findings generally drawn, doesn't fundamentally refute the existence of a managerial
opportunism : the manager could undertake a value destructive strategy of which he would
support a cost as much weaker than his financial stake in the capital decreases with the
performance of the enterprise. This interpretation finds a support through the meaningful
negative impact of manager’s ownership on the diversity of the enterprise (regression 2).
The causal chain that draws these two results, seems to indicate that the leader decreases his
capital ownership when the firm performance lowers and that he then undertake a corporate
diversification. One could see traces of an opportunist behavior there.
Nevertheless the necessary conditions to the demonstration of an opportunist behavior by
diversification are not gathered since the first regression indicates that the diversity of the
enterprise doesn't exercise any impact on the performance. On the contrary, the firm
diversity is determined by its performance as measured by Tobin’s Q (regression 3).
5. Conclusion
To the 3 initial questions of the introduction we are tempted therefore to answer in a quite
moderate way. The part of the capital owned by the manager influences the quality of his
decisions positively in the setting of acquisitions. However the firm’s growth opportunities
(here measured by the Q) incite the manager to increase his capital ownership. We would
be therefore tempted to conclude that it is in firms with high growth opportunities that
managers, strongly engaged in the capital, achieve better acquisitions. To the second
question, our answer is more categorical  : nor the strategic tendency that initiates the
acquisition neither the level of diversification have any influence on the performance of the
enterprise. In conclusion, if one tempts to make a synthesis of these two results to answer to
the third question (existence of a managerial opportunism at the time of diversifying
acquisitions), we answer in a negative way. We cannot suspect an opportunism that
supposes the existence of phenomena (negative impact of the diversification on the value...)
that we don't observe.
Our survey puts in relief the impact of the methodology and of «a priori» (or implicit
hypotheses) that it conceals on the results and on the interpretation that follows. We show
that the «cost of diversification» often cited in the recent studies may (at least partially)
correspond to a bias in evaluations or to the forgetting of the non recursive relations thatSearching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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often prevails, of a theoretical view point, between variables. We think that researches,
especially concerning the diversification/ performance relationship, have to be extensive
and have to integrate the « endogeneity» of strategic decision of the firm
9. Furthermore, the
studie show that it is difficult to exhibit opportunist behavior with statistical analysis on
samples. On average, managerial opportunist behaviors against shareholders can’t be
exhibit on the present period. This is not so surprising in a period in which shareholders
interest (the « financial capital ») is lauding to the skies. As a consequence, managers have ,
on average, no interest to act against this critical resource for the firm. This not to say that
the opportunist inclination hypothesis has to be rejected. This hypothesis proved to be
useful in explaining some phenomenons. Beyond, exhibition of opportunist behaviors
against shareholders should better be search in clinical studies than in statiscal studies in the
recent period.
                                                          
9 On this question of endogeneity, one can see Campa and Kedia (1999).Searching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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APPENDIX 1: diversification index











Where  i p represents the respective weight of the i sector in the total turnover of the
enterprise, n is the number of sectors of the enterprise. With an equal number of sector, this
index increases if the turnover of the firm is distributes in a more egalitarian manner
between its different sectors of activity.
An increase of this index translates therefore a least specialization of the enterprise. This
index grants a important weight to the small sectors of the firm.
The exponential of the entropy indication is called «equivalent number of branches», it
gives the number of branches in which the firm would intervene considering the value of its
index, if its turnover was equi-distributed between its sectors. The entropy index possesses
a property of decomposition: it can be decomposed in the sum of the diversification at the
SIC2 level ( diversification so-called intersectorial or non linked) and of the diversification
at the SIC3 level (intra-sectorial or linked diversification).
In our study the term « diversity » refers exclusively to the index value at a moment. The
term « diversification » refers to this same value or, more often, to the change in the index
between the acquisition year and the year after.Searching for managerial opportunism in diversifying acquisitions...
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